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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
existence of the power to punish for contempt but rather its proper application
in this case, Kilbourn v. Thompson (1880), 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377. Next
in order was the famous Chapman case, where the court denied a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from restraint under a judgment
convicting him under a statute for refusal to answer, saying that the Senate
did have power to punish for contempt a recusant witness and that inquiry
into the Senate's motives in making the investigation, whether for future legis-
lative action or what, was neither necessary nor proper. Re Chapman, (1897)
166 U. S. 661, 41 L. Ed. 1154. The latest case prior to the instant one was
decided in 1917 and was an appeal from a decision of a district court to review
an order refusing relief by habeas corpus to the appellant who had been taken
in custody; the court held that the action of a person in sending an irritating
letter to the chairman of one of the committees of the House respecting its
action and purposes was not such an act of contempt as to be punishable; again,
this is no denial of the power but rather a decision as to its improper application
to the circumstances in hand, Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. Ed. 881.
Thus, it can be seen that never has the power been denied but the courts have at
very infrequent times seen fit to deny it proper application mainly because of
the peculiar facts and situations arising in those particular cases. Judging by
the foregoing, one is practically forced to the conclusion, both because of logic
and precedent, that legislative bodies should be and are invested with the power
to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt and the enforcement of such
a power bids fair to raise the now extremely low number of men who have ever
been convicted of this misconduct. E. L. W. '28.
COURTS-CONTRACT RIGHTS AcQUIRED UNDER EXISTING STATE OF LAW NOT
DISTURBED BY CHANGE OF CONSTRUCTION IN SUBSEQUENT DEcisION.-Where land
was conveyed by deed which was recorded, but the name of one of the grantors
was not properly indexed by the recorder as required by statute, such convey-
ance was valid, a court decision at the time declaring that under existing law
improper indexing did not impair the efficacy of a deed, although this decision
was overruled before the action in the present case, by the court holding that
indexing was a necessary part of registration. Wilkinson et al. v. Wallace, 134
SE. 401.
This case involves one of the points that arose in the much criticised case of
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. In that case a city issued some bonds in aid of
a railroad, which bonds had been held valid by decisions of the state court at
the time the plaintiff acquired his rights. A later decision overruling the prior
decisions was held not to invalidate the bonds of the plaintiff in the Gelpcke
case. The criticism that has been levelled at the doctrine of such cases is that
a contract is created by the court decision, from which position the court could
never withdraw without violating contract rights. The weight of authority,
however, and the sounder rule seems to be that, " . . .if the contract when
made was valid by the laws of the state as then expounded by all departments
of the government, and administered in its courts of justice, its validity and
obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of legislation or de-
cision of its courts altering the construction of the law." Ohio Life &' Trust
Co. v. Debolt, 16 Howard 432.
The defendant in the instant case, contends that the transaction here, occurred
prior to the first case, Davis v. Whitaker, 114 N. C. 279, construing the statute
under which the deed was made, not to mean that improper indexing would
invalidate the deed; and having occurred prior, in point of time to Davis v.
Whitaker, that case would not govern the transaction, but that the latest in-
terpretation of the statute should affect the holding in his case. The latest
interpretation of the statute was that improper indexing invalidated the deed,
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The court holds that it would be immaterial whether the transaction giving
rise to the present case occurred before or after the Davis case which was
later overruled. The Davis case, says the court, was the judicial interpreta-
tion of the purpose, the scope, and the effect of the statute concerning indexing
at the time it was passed and hence embraces the period during which the facts
of this case arose.
As for the criticism that the statute means two different things at different
times and a deed made at one period would be valid, while if made at a later
time under the same statute, would be invalid, the court's statement in that case
would seem to apply here also. Although uniformity is to be desired, never-
theless " . . . there have been heretofore . . .as doubtless there will be here-
after, many exceptional cases," and the court will not "immolate truth, justice,
and the law . .."
Thus it seems that this case goes further than the doctrine announced in the
Gelpcke case, which is the weight of authority, in holding that the deed would
be governed by a case decided later in time, the first one however construing the
statute under which the deed was made and recorded. M. E. B. '27.
CRIMINAL. LAw-ERRoR-BURDEN OF SHOWING PREJUDICE.-In appeal from
conviction of cheating, errors complained of were exclusion of defendant's
testimony of his intent, exclusion of other evidence, and erroneous instruc-
tions. Prosecution claimed errors were not prejudicial. Held, burden is on
prosecution to show errors not prejudicial. People v. Pierce, 218 N. Y. S. 249
(1926).
This is in accord with other New York decisions, People v. Smith, 172 N. Y.
210, 64 N. E. 814 (1902) (cited), and with the weight of authority in other
jurisdictions. Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 29 S. Ct. 260, 53 L.
Ed. 465, 15 Ann. Cas. 392 (1909). This rule is adopted in the Missouri case
of State v. Tracy, 294 Mo. 372, 243 S. W. 173 (1922), and by dicta in other
Missouri cases. But it has been criticised recently on the ground that it is
more favorable to the accused than modern experience in administering crim-
inal law warrants, Lawrence v. State (Ariz. 1925), 240 P. 863, and there are a
number of states which follow a contrary rule, holding that errors are not
presumed prejudicial, but the excepting defendant must show that he was
harmed. Collingswood v. State, 13 Okl. Cr. 443, 164 P. 1154 (1917) (exclusion of
evidence) ; Kennedy v. State, 119 Ark. 611, 178 S. W. 920 (1915) (separation of
jury). These decisions, however, are subject to the exception that prejudice will
be presumed if the trial has been unfair to such an extent that it can hardly be
said the errors were made in good faith, Dupree v. State, 10 Okl. Cr. 65, 134
P. 86, and should not be understood as altering the rule that, where the ques-
tion of prejudice depends upon the effect of the evidence on the jury's mind,
and the evidence is conflicting, the view most favorable to the accused will
be taken in determining whether he has been harmed. Crosby v. State, 154
Ark. 20, 241 S. W. 380 (1922). Courts which ordinarily do not recognize
the rule that the burden of showing prejudice is on the appellant in criminal
cases, sometimes follow it when the error is a minor, technical one, Loman v.
State, 19 Ala. Ap. 611, 99 So. 769 (1924), or where the matter complained of is
in the discretion of the trial court. Cox v. State, 138 Miss. 370, 103 So. 129
(1925) (granting continuance). The modern tendency is to restrict, rather than
to enlarge, the presumption of prejudice, unless the error is material. State v.
Bosch, 172, Iowa 88, 153 N. W. 73 (1915). Often this is accomplished by the
aid of statutes or constitutional provisions, which are not necessarily incapable
of being interpreted otherwise than as throwing the burden of proving prejudice
on the appellant. State v. Seyboldt, (Utah 1925) 236 P. 225 (statute); Law-
rence v. State, supra (constitutional provision).
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